# Collision Attack on Reduced-Round Camellia\*

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Abstract. Camellia is the final winner of 128-bit block cipher in NESSIE. In this paper, we construct some efficient distinguishers between 4-round Camellia and a random permutation of the blocks space. By using collision-searching techniques, the distinguishers are used to attack on 6,7,8 and 9 rounds of Camellia with 128-bit key and 8,9 and 10 rounds of Camellia with 192/256-bit key. The 128-bit key of 6 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2<sup>10</sup> chosen plaintexts and 2<sup>15</sup> encryptions. The 128-bit key of 7 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2<sup>12</sup> chosen plaintexts and 2<sup>54.5</sup> encryptions. The 128-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2<sup>13</sup> chosen plaintexts and 2<sup>112.1</sup> encryptions. The 128-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2<sup>13.6</sup> chosen plaintexts and 2<sup>121</sup> encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2<sup>13</sup> chosen plaintexts and 2<sup>175.6</sup> encryptions. The 256-bit key of 10 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2<sup>13</sup> chosen plaintexts and 2<sup>175.6</sup> encryptions. The 256-bit key of 10 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2<sup>14</sup> chosen plaintexts and 2<sup>239.9</sup> encryptions.

**Key words:** Block cipher; Camellia; data complexity; time complexity

### 1 Introduction

Camellia<sup>[1]</sup> is a 128-bit block cipher which was published by NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000 and recently selected as the final selection of the NESSIE<sup>[2]</sup>project, and also suggested as a candidate for the CRYPTREC project in Japan [3]. The security of Camellia has been studied by many researchers [4  $\sim$  11]. The security of Camellia against higher-order differential cryptanalysis is discussed in [4] and [5]. A truncated differential attack on 8-round variant of Camellia without  $FL/FL^{-1}$  functions is presented in [6] requiring 2<sup>55.6</sup> encryptions and 2<sup>83.6</sup> chosen plaintexts. Truncated and impossible differential cryptanalysis of Camellia without  $FL/FL^{-1}$  functions is described in [7]. A differential attack on 9 rounds Camellia without  $FL/FL^{-1}$  functions is proposed in [8] requiring 2<sup>105</sup> chosen plaintexts. The security of Camellia against Square attack is discussed in [9] and [10]. Furthermore, Yeom et.al. have studied integral properties and apply them to Camellia.

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In this paper we present collision attacks on reduced-round variants of Camellia without  $FL/FL^{-1}$  and whitening function layers as mentioned below. The attack on 6-round of 128-bit key Camellia is more efficient than known attacks. The complexities of the attack on 7(8,9,10)-round Camellia without  $FL/FL^{-1}$  functions are less than that of previous attacks.

Section 2 briefly describes the structures of Camellia, 4-round distinguishers and properties are explained in Section 3. In Section 4, we show how to use the 4-round distinguishers to attack 6,7,8 and 9 rounds of Camellia with 128-bit key. In section 5, we describe attacks on 8,9 and 10 rounds of Camellia with 192/256-bit key. Finally, in section 6 we conclude this paper.

## 2 Description of the Camellia

Camellia has a 128 bit block size and supports 128,192 and 256 bit keys. The design of Camellia is based on the Feistel structure and its number of rounds is 18(128 bit key) or 24(192/256 bit key). The  $FL/FL^{-1}$ function layer is inserted at every 6 rounds. Before the first round and after the last round, there are pre- and post-whitening layers which use bitwise exclusive-or operations with 128 bit subkeys, respectively. But we will consider camellia without  $FL/FL^{-1}$  function layer and whitening layers and call it modified camellia.

Let  $L_{r-1}$  and  $R_{r-1}$  be the left and the right halves of the  $r^{th}$  round inputs, and  $k_r$  be the  $r^{th}$  round subkey. Then the Feistel structure of Camellia can be written as

$$L_r = R_{r-1} \oplus F(L_{r-1}, k_r),$$
  

$$R_r = L_{r-1},$$

here F is the round function defined below:

$$F: F_2^{64} \times F_2^{64} \longrightarrow F_2^{64},$$
 
$$(X_{64}, k_{64}) \longrightarrow Y_{(64)} = P(S(X_{(64)} \oplus k_{(64)})).$$

where S and P are defined as follows:

$$\begin{split} S &: F_2^{64} \longrightarrow F_2^{64}, \\ & l_{1(8)}||l_{2(8)}||l_{3(8)}||l_{4(8)}||l_{5(8)}||l_{6(8)}||l_{7(8)}||l_{8(8)} \longrightarrow l_{1(8)}^*||l_{2(8)}^*||l_{3(8)}^*||l_{5(8)}^*||l_{5(8)}^*||l_{8(8)}^*||l_{8(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*||l_{1(8)}^*|$$

$$Z_1^* = Z_1 \oplus Z_3 \oplus Z_4 \oplus Z_6 \oplus Z_7 \oplus Z_8,$$

$$Z_2^* = Z_1 \oplus Z_2 \oplus Z_4 \oplus Z_5 \oplus Z_7 \oplus Z_8,$$

$$Z_3^* = Z_1 \oplus Z_2 \oplus Z_3 \oplus Z_5 \oplus Z_6 \oplus Z_8,$$

$$Z_4^* = Z_2 \oplus Z_3 \oplus Z_4 \oplus Z_5 \oplus Z_6 \oplus Z_7,$$

$$Z_8^* = Z_1 \oplus Z_2 \oplus Z_3 \oplus Z_4 \oplus Z_5 \oplus Z_6 \oplus Z_8,$$

$$Z_8^* = Z_1 \oplus Z_4 \oplus Z_5 \oplus Z_6 \oplus Z_7,$$

$$Z_8^* = Z_1 \oplus Z_4 \oplus Z_5 \oplus Z_6 \oplus Z_7.$$

Below briefly describes the key schedule of Camellia. First two 128-bit variables  $K_L$  and  $K_R$  are generated from the user key. Then two 128-bit variables  $K_A$  and  $K_B$  are generated from  $K_L$  and  $K_R$ . Note that  $K_B$  is used only when the user key is of 192 or 256 bits. The round subkeys are generated by rotating  $K_L$ ,  $K_R$ ,  $K_A$  and  $K_B$ . Details are shown in [1].

## 3 4-Round Distinguishers

Choose

$$L_0 = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \cdots, \alpha_8),$$
  $R_0 = (x, \beta_2, \cdots, \beta_8).$ 

where x take values in  $F_2^8$ ,  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_j$  are constants in  $F_2^8$ . Thus, the input of 2nd round can be written as follows:

$$L_1 = (x \oplus \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \cdots, \gamma_8),$$
  $R_1 = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \cdots, \alpha_8),$ 

where  $\gamma_i$  are entirely determined by  $\alpha_i (1 \le i \le 8)$ ,  $\beta_j (2 \le j \le 8)$  and  $k_1$ , so  $\gamma_i$  are constants when the user key is fixed. In the 2nd round a transformation on  $L_1$  using  $F(\bullet, k_2)$  is as follows:

$$L_1 = (x \oplus \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \cdots, \gamma_8) \xrightarrow{F(\bullet, k_2)} (y \oplus \theta_1, y \oplus \theta_2, y \oplus \theta_3, \theta_4, y \oplus \theta_5, \theta_6, \theta_7, y \oplus \theta_8)$$

where  $y = s_1(x \oplus \gamma_1 \oplus k_{2,1})$ ,  $k_{2,1}$  is the first byte of  $k_2$ ,  $\theta_i$  are entirely determined by  $\gamma_i (1 \le i \le 8)$  and  $k_2$ , thus  $\theta_i$  are constants when the user key is fixed. Therefore, the output of 2nd round is

$$L_2 = (y \oplus \varpi_1, y \oplus \varpi_2, y \oplus \varpi_3, \varpi_4, y \oplus \varpi_5, \varpi_6, \varpi_7, y \oplus \varpi_8),$$

$$R_2 = L_1 = (x \oplus \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \cdots, \gamma_8),$$

where  $\varpi_i = \theta_i \oplus \alpha_i$  are constants. In the 3rd round a transformation on  $L_2$  using  $F(\bullet, k_3)$  is as follows:

$$L_2 = (y \oplus \varpi_1, y \oplus \varpi_2, y \oplus \varpi_3, \varpi_4, y \oplus \varpi_5, \varpi_6, \varpi_7, y \oplus \varpi_8) \xrightarrow{F(\bullet, k_3)} (z_1, z_2, \cdots, z_8).$$

Thus, we have the left half of output for the 3rd round:

$$L_3 = (z_1 \oplus x \oplus \gamma_1, z_2 \oplus \gamma_2, z_3 \oplus \gamma_3, \cdots, z_8 \oplus \gamma_8).$$

So the right half of output for the 4th round is as follows:

$$R_4 = L_3 = (z_1 \oplus x \oplus \gamma_1, z_2 \oplus \gamma_2, z_3 \oplus \gamma_3, \cdots, z_8 \oplus \gamma_8).$$

Now we analyze the relations among bytes of  $R_4$ . By observing the equation  $(z_1, z_2, \dots, z_8) = F(L_2, k_3)$ , we get the following equations

$$z_3 \oplus z_4 \oplus z_5 \oplus z_6 \oplus z_7 = s_4(\varpi_7 \oplus k_{3,7}) \oplus \sigma_1 \tag{1}$$

$$z_2 \oplus z_3 \oplus z_4 \oplus z_6 \oplus z_7 \oplus z_8 = s_1(y \oplus \varpi_1 \oplus k_{3,1}) \oplus \sigma_2 \tag{2}$$

$$z_2 \oplus z_3 \oplus z_5 \oplus z_6 \oplus z_8 = s_3(\varpi_6 \oplus k_{3,6}) \oplus \sigma_3 \tag{3}$$

$$z_1 \oplus z_7 \oplus z_8 = s_4(\varpi_7 \oplus k_{3,4}) \oplus s_3(\varpi_6 \oplus k_{3,6}) \oplus \sigma_4 \tag{4}$$

$$z_3 \oplus z_4 \oplus z_5 = s_4(\varpi_4 \oplus k_{3,4}) \oplus s_2(y \oplus \varpi_2 \oplus k_{3,2}) \oplus s_3(\varpi_6 \oplus k_{3,6}) \oplus \sigma_5$$
 (5)

$$z_2 \oplus z_4 \oplus z_5 \oplus z_6 \oplus z_7 = s_4(\varpi_4 \oplus k_{3,4}) \oplus s_3(y \oplus \varpi_3 \oplus k_{3,3}) \oplus s_3(\varpi_6 \oplus k_{3,6}) \oplus \sigma_6$$
 (6)

$$z_2 \oplus z_5 = s_4(\varpi_4 \oplus k_{3,4}) \oplus s_2(y \oplus \varpi_5 \oplus k_{3,5}) \oplus s_3(\varpi_6 \oplus k_{3,6}) \oplus \sigma_7 \tag{7}$$

$$z_4 \oplus z_6 = s_4(\varpi_4 \oplus k_{3,4}) \oplus s_1(y \oplus \varpi_8 \oplus k_{3,8}) \oplus s_3(\varpi_6 \oplus k_{3,6}) \oplus \sigma_8 \tag{8}$$

 $\sigma_i (1 \leq i \leq 8)$  in above equations are entirely determined by  $\varpi_i (1 \leq i \leq 8)$  and  $k_3$ , so  $\sigma_i$  are constants when the user key is fixed. Because  $s_1$  is a permutation,  $y = s_1(x \oplus \gamma_1 \oplus k_{2,1})$  differs when x takes different values. As a consequence,  $s_1(y \oplus \varpi_1 \oplus k_{3,1})$  will have different values. Similarly,  $s_2(y \oplus \varpi_2 \oplus k_{3,2})$ ,  $s_3(y \oplus \varpi_3 \oplus k_{3,3})$ ,  $s_2(y \oplus \varpi_5 \oplus k_{3,5})$  and  $s_1(y \oplus \varpi_8 \oplus k_{3,8})$  have the same property as  $s_1(y \oplus \varpi_1 \oplus k_{3,1})$ . Obviously,  $s_4(\varpi_4 \oplus k_{3,4})$ ,  $s_3(\varpi_6 \oplus k_{3,6})$  and  $s_4(\varpi_7 \oplus k_{3,7})$  are constants, Thus, from the above discussion we know that  $z_3 \oplus z_4 \oplus z_5 \oplus z_6 \oplus z_7$ ,  $z_2 \oplus z_3 \oplus z_5 \oplus z_6 \oplus z_8$  and  $z_1 \oplus z_7 \oplus z_8$  are constants, and  $z_2 \oplus z_3 \oplus z_4 \oplus z_5 \oplus z_6 \oplus z_7 \oplus z_8$ ,  $z_3 \oplus z_4 \oplus z_5$ ,  $z_2 \oplus z_4 \oplus z_5 \oplus z_6 \oplus z_7$ ,  $z_2 \oplus z_5$  and  $z_4 \oplus z_6$  each will have different values when x takes different values. Therefore we get the following lemma by considering  $R_4 = L_3 = (z_1 \oplus x \oplus \gamma_1, z_2 \oplus \gamma_2, z_3 \oplus \gamma_3, \cdots, z_8 \oplus \gamma_8)$ .

**Lemma:** Let  $P = (L_0, R_0)$  and  $P_0^* = (L_0^*, R_0^*)$  be two plaintexts of 4-round Camellia,  $C = (L_4, R_4)$  and  $C_4^* = (L_4^*, R_4^*)$  be the corresponding ciphertexts,  $R_{0,i}$  denote the  $i^{th}$  byte of  $R_0$ . If  $L_0 = L_0^*, R_{0,1} \neq R_{0,1}^*, R_{0,j} = R_{0,j}^* (2 \le j \le 8)$ , then  $R_4$  and  $R_4^*$  satisfy:

$$R_{4,3} \oplus R_{4,4} \oplus R_{4,5} \oplus R_{4,6} \oplus R_{4,7} = R_{4,3}^* \oplus R_{4,4}^* \oplus R_{4,5}^* \oplus R_{4,6}^* \oplus R_{4,7}^* \tag{1}$$

$$R_{4,2} \oplus R_{4,3} \oplus R_{4,5} \oplus R_{4,6} \oplus R_{4,8} = R_{4,2}^* \oplus R_{4,3}^* \oplus R_{4,5}^* \oplus R_{4,6}^* \oplus R_{4,8}^* \tag{2}$$

$$R_{4,2} \oplus R_{4,3} \oplus R_{4,4} \oplus R_{4,6} \oplus R_{4,7} \oplus R_{4,8} = R_{4,2}^* \oplus R_{4,3}^* \oplus R_{4,4}^* \oplus R_{4,6}^* \oplus R_{4,7}^* \oplus R_{4,8}^*$$
 (3)

$$R_{4,1} \oplus R_{4,7} \oplus R_{4,8} = R_{4,1}^* \oplus R_{4,7}^* \oplus R_{4,8}^* \tag{4}$$

$$R_{4,3} \oplus R_{4,4} \oplus R_{4,5} = R_{4,3}^* \oplus R_{4,4}^* \oplus R_{4,5}^* \tag{5}$$

$$R_{4,2} \oplus R_{4,4} \oplus R_{4,5} \oplus R_{4,6} \oplus R_{4,7} = R_{4,2}^* \oplus R_{4,4}^* \oplus R_{4,5}^* \oplus R_{4,6}^* \oplus R_{4,7}^* \tag{6}$$

$$R_{4,2} \oplus R_{4,5} = R_{4,2}^* \oplus R_{4,5}^* \tag{7}$$

$$R_{4,4} \oplus R_{4,6} = R_{4,4}^* \oplus R_{4,6}^* \tag{8}$$

The above properties in the lemma provide some efficient 4-round distinguishers. They will be used to attack reduced-round Camellia.

## 4 Attacks on Reduced-Round Camellia with 128 bit key

#### 4.1 Attacking 6-round Camellia with 128 bit key

This section explains the attack on 6-round Camellia with 128-bit key in some detail. First we recover the first byte  $k_{1,1}$  of  $k_1$  and the seventh byte  $k_{6,7}$  of  $k_6$ . From the key schedule for 128-bit key, we know that  $k_{6,7}[2 \sim 8] = k_{1,1}[1 \sim 7]$ , so we only need to guess 9 bits. Using the Property1, we construct the following algorithm to  $\operatorname{recover}(k_{1,1}, k_{6,7})$ :

#### Algorithm 1

Step1, For each possible value t of  $k_{1,1}$ , choose two plaintexts  $P0^t = (L0_0^t, R0_0^t)$  and  $P1^t = (L1_0^t, R1_0^t)$  as follows:

$$L0_0^t = (i_0, \alpha_2, \cdots, \alpha_8),$$

$$R0_0^t = (s_1(i_0 \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i_0 \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i_0 \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_4, s_1(i_0 \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_6, \beta_7, s_1(i_0 \oplus k_{1,1})),$$

$$L1_0^t = (i_1, \alpha_2, \cdots, \alpha_8),$$

$$R1_0^t = (s_1(i_1 \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i_1 \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i_1 \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_4, s_1(i_1 \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_6, \beta_7, s_1(i_1 \oplus k_{1,1})).$$

where  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_j$  are constants,  $0 \le i_0 < i_1 \le 255$ . The corresponding ciphertexts are  $C0^t = (L0_6^t, R0_6^t)$  and  $C1^t = (L1_6^t, R1_6^t)$ .

Step2, For each possible value of  $(t, k_{6,7})$ , compute

$$\Delta_0 = s_4(R0_{6,7}^t \oplus k_{6,7}) \oplus (L0_{6,3}^t \oplus L0_{6,4}^t \oplus L0_{6,5}^t \oplus L0_{6,6}^t \oplus L0_{6,7}^t,$$
  
$$\Delta_1 = s_4(R1_{6,7}^t \oplus k_{6,7}) \oplus (L1_{6,3}^t \oplus L1_{6,4}^t \oplus L1_{6,5}^t \oplus L1_{6,6}^t \oplus L1_{6,7}^t.$$

Check if  $\triangle_0$  equals  $\triangle_1$ . If so, record the corresponding value of  $(t, k_{6,7})$ . Otherwise, move to next value of  $(t, k_{6,7})$ .

Step3, For the recorded value of  $(t, k_{6,7})$  in Step2, choose some other plaintexts  $P2^t (\neq P0^t, P1^t)$ , compute  $\triangle_2$ , and check if  $\triangle_2$  equals  $\triangle_0$ , if so, record the corresponding value of  $(t, k_{6,7})$ , otherwise, discard the value of  $(t, k_{6,7})$ . If there are more than one recorded value, then repeat Step 3 on the newly recorded values.

Take q values at random over  $F_2^8$ , the probability of that they are the same is  $2^{-8(q-1)}$ . So invalid subkey will pass step2 with a probability  $2^{-8}$ , and there are about  $2^9 \times 2^{-8} = 2$  remaining values after step2. So the attack requires less than  $3 \times 2^8$  chosen plaintexts. The main time complexity of attack is from step2, where the time complexity of computing each  $\triangle$  is about the same as the 1-round encryption, so the time complexity of attack is less than  $2^9$  encryptions.

Knowing  $k_{1,1}$ , we can choose plaintexts such that the outputs of the first round meet the requirement of distinguishers in section 3. Thus,  $R_5$  satisfies Property3, and from  $R_5 = L_6 \oplus F(R_6, k_6)$  and that  $s_1(R_{6,1} \oplus k_{6,1})$  is the result of XOR of the 2nd ,3rd ,4th ,6th,7th and 8th byte of  $F(R_6, k_6)$ , we have

$$R_{5,2} \oplus R_{5,3} \oplus R_{5,4} \oplus R_{5,6} \oplus R_{5,7} \oplus R_{5,8} = L_{6,2} \oplus L_{6,3} \oplus L_{6,4} \oplus L_{6,6} \oplus L_{6,7} \oplus L_{6,8} \oplus s_1(R_{6,1} \oplus k_{6,1}).$$

Using this equation and property (3), we can construct the following algorithm to recover  $k_{6,1}$ :

#### Algorithm 2

Step1. Choose 64 plaintexts  $P^i = (L_0^i, R_0^i)(0 \le i \le 63)$  as follows:

$$L_0^i = (i, \alpha_2, \cdots, \alpha_8),$$

$$R_0^t = (s_1(i \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_4, s_1(i \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_6, \beta_7, s_1(i \oplus k_{1,1})).$$

where  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_j$  are constants. Denote by  $C^i = (L_6^i, R_6^i)$  the corresponding ciphertexts of the above plaintexts.

Step2, For each possible value of  $k_{6,1}$ , compute

$$\triangle_i = s_1(R_{6,1}^i \oplus k_{6,1}) \oplus (L_{6,2}^i \oplus L_{6,3}^i \oplus L_{6,4}^i \oplus L_{6,6}^i \oplus L_{6,7}^i \oplus L_{6,8}^i).$$

Check if there are collisions among  $\triangle_i$ . If so, discard the value of  $k_{6,1}$ . Otherwise, output  $k_{6,1}$ .

Step3, From the output values of  $k_{6,1}$  in Step2, choose some other plaintexts, and repeat Step2.

The probability of at least one collision occurs when we throw 64 balls into 256 buckets at random is larger than  $1 - e^{-64(64-1)/2 \times 2^8} \ge 1 - 2^{-11}$ . So the probability of wrong output (invalid subkey) in Step2 is less than  $2^{-11}$ . For the 256 possible values of  $k_{6,1}$ , at most 64 more plaintexts are needed in Step3. Thus, the attack requires less than  $2^7$  chosen plaintexts and  $2^{12}$  encryptions.

Similarly, using property (2) and the plaintexts chosen in algorithm 2, we can recover  $k_{6.6}$  by computing

$$\triangle_i = s_3(R_{6,6}^i \oplus k_{6,6}) \oplus (L_{6,2}^i \oplus L_{6,3}^i \oplus L_{6,5}^i \oplus L_{6,6}^i \oplus L_{6,8}^i).$$

Check if  $\triangle_i$  is a constant. If so, output the value of  $k_{6,6}$ , otherwise, discard the value of  $k_{6,6}$ . Here the attack requires  $2^{10}$  encryptions.

And using  $k_{6,6}$ , property (4) and the plaintexts chosen in algorithm 2, we can recover  $k_{6,4}$  by computing

$$\triangle_i = s_4(R_{6,4}^i \oplus k_{6,4}) \oplus s_3(R_{6,6}^i \oplus k_{6,6}) \oplus (L_{6,1}^i \oplus L_{6,7}^i \oplus L_{6,8}^i).$$

and the attack requires  $2^{12}$  encryptions.

And using property (5) and the plaintexts chosen in algorithm 2, we can recover  $k_{6,2}$  by computing

$$\triangle_i = s_4(R_{6,4}^i \oplus k_{6,4}) \oplus s_2(R_{6,2}^i \oplus k_{6,2}) \oplus s_3(R_{6,6}^i \oplus k_{6,6}) \oplus (L_{6,3}^i \oplus L_{6,4}^i \oplus L_{6,5}^i).$$

and the attack requires  $2^{12}$  encryptions.

And using property (6) and the plaintexts chosen in algorithm 2, we can recover  $k_{6,3}$  by computing

$$\triangle_i = s_4(R_{6,4}^i \oplus k_{6,4}) \oplus s_3(R_{6,3}^i \oplus k_{6,3}) \oplus s_3(R_{6,6}^i \oplus k_{6,6}) \oplus (L_{6,2}^i \oplus L_{6,4}^i \oplus L_{6,5}^i \oplus L_{6,6}^i \oplus L_{6,7}^i).$$

and the attack requires  $2^{12}$  encryptions.

And using property (7) and the plaintexts chosen in algorithm 2, we can recover  $k_{6,5}$  by computing

$$\triangle_i = s_4(R_{6,4}^i \oplus k_{6,4}) \oplus s_2(R_{6,5}^i \oplus k_{6,5}) \oplus s_3(R_{6,6}^i \oplus k_{6,6}) \oplus (L_{6,2}^i \oplus L_{6,5}^i).$$

and the attack requires  $2^{12}$  encryptions.

And using property (8) and the plaintexts chosen in algorithm 2, we can recover  $k_{6,8}$  by computing

$$\triangle_i = s_4(R_{6,4}^i \oplus k_{6,4}) \oplus s_1(R_{6,8}^i \oplus k_{6,8}) \oplus s_3(R_{6,6}^i \oplus k_{6,6}) \oplus (L_{6,4}^i \oplus L_{6,6}^i).$$

and the attack requires  $2^{12}$  encryptions.

Now we have recovered  $k_{1,1}$  and  $k_6$ , using less than  $2^{10}$  chosen plaintexts and  $6 \times 2^{12} + 2^{10} + 2^9$  encryptions. Similarly, by decrypting the 6th round, we can recover  $k_5$ . Therefore, the attack on the 6-round Camellia requires less than  $2^{10}$  chosen plaintexts and  $2^{15}$  encryptions.

#### 4.2 Attacking 7-round Camellia with 128 bit key

From the structure of the round function, we have

$$R_{6,7} = L_{7,7} \oplus s_3(R_{7,3} \oplus k_{7,3}) \oplus s_4(R_{7,4} \oplus k_{7,4}) \oplus s_2(R_{7,5} \oplus k_{7,5}) \oplus s_3(R_{7,6} \oplus k_{7,6}) \oplus s_1(R_{7,8} \oplus k_{7,8}).$$

Similar to algorithm 1 we can construct the following algorithm to recover  $k_{1,1}$  and  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$ :

#### Algorithm3

Step1, For each possible value t of  $k_{1,1}$ , Choose 7 plaintexts  $Pj^t = (Lj_0^t, Rj_0^t)(1 \le j \le 7)$  as follows:

$$Lj_0^t = (i_j, \alpha_2, \cdots, \alpha_8),$$
  

$$Rj_0^t = (s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_4, s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_6, \beta_7, s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1})).$$

where  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_j$  are constants,  $(0 \le i_j \le 255)$ , and the the corresponding ciphertexts are  $Cj^t = (Lj_7^t, Rj_7^t)$ .

Step2, For each fixed t, and for each possible value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$ , First compute  $\triangle_1$  and  $\triangle_2$ , where

$$\Delta_j = s_4(Rj_{6,7}^t \oplus k_{6,7}) \oplus (Rj_{7,3}^t \oplus Rj_{7,4}^t \oplus Rj_{7,5}^t \oplus Rj_{7,6}^t \oplus Rj_{7,7}^t),$$

$$Rj_{6,7}^t = Lj_{7,7}^t \oplus s_3(Rj_{7,3}^t \oplus k_{7,3}) \oplus s_4(Rj_{7,4}^t \oplus k_{7,4}) \oplus s_2(Rj_{7,5}^t \oplus k_{7,5}) \oplus s_3(Rj_{7,6}^t \oplus k_{7,6}) \oplus s_1(Rj_{7,8}^t \oplus k_{7,8}).$$

Check if  $\triangle_1$  equals  $\triangle_2$ . If so, output the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$ .

For the output values of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$ , comput  $\triangle_3$ , check if  $\triangle_3$  equals  $\triangle_1$ . If so, output the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$ . Similar process will go through  $\triangle_4$  up to  $\triangle_7$ .

Step3, For the output values of  $(t, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$  in Step2, choose some other plaintexts  $P8^t (\neq Pj^t, 1 \leq j \leq 7)$ , compute  $\triangle_8$ , check if  $\triangle_8$  equals  $\triangle_1$ . If so, output the value of  $(t, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(t, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$ . If there are more than one output value, then repeat Step3.

Invalid values of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$  that can pass Step2 will be successful with probability  $2^{-48}$ . Thus it is likely that there is only one output value for any fixed t after Step2, so there are about  $2^8$  different values after step2. Thus, the attack requires  $7 \times 2^8 + 2^8 + 2^8 = 9 \times 2^8$  chosen plaintexts. The main time complexity of the attack is in Step2, and the time of computing each  $\triangle$  is about the same as 1-round encryption, so the time complexity of an attack is less than that of  $(2 \times 2^8 \times 2^{48} + 2^8 \times 2^{40} + 2^8 \times 2^{33}) \times 1/7 < 2^{54} + 2^{52}$  encryptions.

Now we have recovered  $k_{1,1}$  and  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8})$ , we can recover the other bytes of  $k_7$ ,  $k_6$  and  $k_5$ , so we can get the user key of 7-round Camellia, the attack requires less than  $2^{12}$  chosen plaintexts and  $2^{54.5}$  encryptions.

#### 4.3 Attacking 8-round Camellia with 128 bit key

Similar to algorithm 3,we can recover  $k_{1,1}$  and  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8)$ . Given  $k_{1,1}$ , we can get 7 bits of  $k_{6,7}$  from the key schedule. Thus, $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8)$  have  $2^{105}$  possible values. Here the attack requires 14 chosen plaintexts at step1. Invalid values of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8)$  that pass Step2 will be successful with probability  $2^{-104}$ . There are about  $2^9$  output values of step2. So, the attack requires  $2^{12}$  chosen plaintexts. The main time complexity of the attack is in step2, where the time of computing each  $\triangle$  is about the 2-round encryption, so the time complexity of the attack is less than that of  $(2 \times 2^8 \times 2^{105} + 2^8 \times 2^{97} + 2^8 \times 2^{90}) \times 1/4 < 2^{112} + 2^{103} + 2^{96}$  encryptions. Now we have recovered  $k_{1,1}$  and  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8)$ , we can decrypt the 8th round and recover the other bytes of  $k_7$ , so we can get the user key of 8-round Camellia, the attack requires less than  $2^{13}$  chosen plaintexts and  $2^{112.1}$  encryptions.

#### 4.4 Attacking 9-round Camellia with 128 bit key

If we use the 4-round distinguisher from the 2nd to the 5th rounds of encryption as in the case of 8-round, then the time complexity of recovering 9-round Camellia key is larger than  $2^{128}$  which is apparently useless. So we will use the 4-round distinguisher only from the 4th to the 7th round. First guess  $k_1, k_{2,1}, k_{2,2}, k_{2,3}, k_{2,5}, k_{2,8}, k_{3,1}, k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8}$ . When  $(k_1, k_{2,1}, k_{2,2}, k_{2,3}, k_{2,5}, k_{2,8})$  is given, we only need to guess 3 bits of  $(k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8})$ .

#### Algorithm 4

Step1, For each possible value t of  $(k_1, k_{2,1}, k_{2,2}, k_{2,3}, k_{2,5}, k_{2,8}, k_{3,1})$ , Choose 3 plaintexts  $Pj^t = (Lj_0^t, Rj_0^t)(1 \le j \le 3)$  such that

$$Lj_2^t = (i_j, \alpha_2, \cdots, \alpha_8),$$
  

$$Rj_2^t = (s_1(i_j \oplus k_{3,1}), s_1(i_j \oplus k_{3,1}), s_1(i_j \oplus k_{3,1}), \beta_4, s_1(i_j \oplus k_{3,1}), \beta_6, \beta_7, s_1(i_j \oplus k_{3,1})).$$

where  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_j$  are constants,  $0 \leq i_j \leq 255$ , and the corresponding ciphertexts are

$$Cj^t = (Lj_0^t, Rj_0^t).$$

Step2, For each fixed value of t, and for each possible value of  $(k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8})$ , compute  $\triangle_1$  and  $\triangle_2$ , where

$$\Delta_j = s_4(Rj_{8,7}^t \oplus k_{8,7}) \oplus (Rj_{9,3}^t \oplus Rj_{9,4}^t \oplus Rj_{9,5}^t \oplus Rj_{9,6}^t \oplus Rj_{9,7}^t),$$

$$Rj_{8,7}^t = Lj_{9,7}^t \oplus s_3(Rj_{9,3}^t \oplus k_{9,3}) \oplus s_4(Rj_{9,4}^t \oplus k_{9,4}) \oplus s_2(Rj_{9,5}^t \oplus k_{9,5}) \oplus s_3(Rj_{9,6}^t \oplus k_{9,6}) \oplus s_1(Rj_{9,8}^t \oplus k_{9,8}).$$

Check if  $\triangle_1$  equals  $\triangle_2$ . If so, output the value of  $(k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8})$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8})$ .

For the output values of  $(k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8})$ , comput  $\triangle_3$ , check if  $\triangle_3$  equals  $\triangle_1$ . If so, output the value of  $(k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8})$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8})$ .

Step3, For the output values of  $(t, k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8})$  in Step2, Choose some other plaintexts  $P4^t (\neq Pj^t, 1 \leq j \leq 3)$ , compute  $\triangle_4$ , check if  $\triangle_4$  equals  $\triangle_1$ . If so, output the value of  $(t, k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8})$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(t, k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8})$ . If there are more than one output value, then repeat Step3.

Wrong values will pass step2 successfully with probability  $2^{-16}$ . Thus there are about  $2^{123} \times 2^{-16} = 2^{107}$  output values in step2. So, the attack requires less than  $3 \times 2^{112} + 2^{108}$  chosen plaintexts. The main time complexity of the attack is in Step2, the time of computing each  $\triangle$  is about the 1-round encryption, so the time complexity of the attack is less than  $(2 \times 2^{112} \times 2^{11} + 2^{116}) \times 1/9 < 2^{120} + 2^{119} + 2^{118} + 2^{117}$  encryptions.

Now we know  $k_1, k_{2,1}, k_{2,2}, k_{2,3}, k_{2,5}, k_{2,8}, k_{3,1}, k_{8,7}, k_{9,3}, k_{9,4}, k_{9,5}, k_{9,6}, k_{9,8}$ , we can recover the other bytes of  $k_9$  and get the user key of 9-round Camellia. The attack requires less than  $2^{113.6}$  chosen plaintexts and  $2^{121}$  encryptions.

# 5 Attacks Reduced-Round Camellia with 192/256 bit key

#### 5.1 Attacking 8-round Camellia with 192/256 bit key

First guess  $k_{1,1}$ ,  $k_{6,7}$ ,  $k_{7,3}$ ,  $k_{7,4}$ ,  $k_{7,5}$ ,  $k_{7,6}$ ,  $k_{7,8}$ ,  $k_8$ . When  $k_{1,1}$  is given, we can get 8 bits of  $k_8$  from the key schedule. So we need guess 120 bits subkey. Similar to section 4.3, we can attack 8-round camellia with 192/256-bit key, requiring  $2^{13}$  chosen plaintexts and  $2^{111.1}$  encryptions.

#### 5.2 Attacking 9-round Camellia with 192/256 bit key

First guess  $k_{1,1}$ ,  $k_{6,7}$ ,  $k_{7,3}$ ,  $k_{7,4}$ ,  $k_{7,5}$ ,  $k_{7,6}$ ,  $k_{7,8}$ ,  $k_{8}$ ,  $k_{9}$ . When  $k_{1,1}$  is given, we can get 8 bits of  $k_{8}$  from the key schedule. So we need guess 176 bits subkey. Using property1we can construct the following algorithm:

#### Algorithm 5

Step1, For each possible value t of  $k_{1,1}$ , Choose 22 plaintexts  $Pj^t = (Lj_0^t, Rj_0^t)(1 \le j \le 22)$  as follows:

$$Lj_0^t = (i_j, \alpha_2, \cdots, \alpha_8),$$
  

$$Rj_0^t = (s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_4, s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_6, \beta_7, s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1})).$$

where  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_j$  are constants,  $0 \le i_j \le 255$ , and the the corresponding ciphertexts are  $Cj^t = (Lj_0^t, Rj_0^t)$ .

Step2, For each fixed value of t, for each possible value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$ , First compute  $\triangle_1$  and  $\triangle_2$ , where

$$\Delta_j = s_4(Rj_{6,7}^t \oplus k_{6,7}) \oplus (Rj_{7,3}^t \oplus Rj_{7,4}^t \oplus Rj_{7,5}^t \oplus Rj_{7,6}^t \oplus Rj_{7,7}^t),$$

and

$$Lj_7^t = Rj_8^t, Rj_7^t = Lj_8^t \oplus F(Rj_8^t, k_8), Lj_8^t = Rj_9^t, Rj_8^t = Lj_9^t \oplus F(Rj_9^t, k_9),$$

$$Rj_{6,7}^t = Lj_{7,7}^t \oplus s_3(Rj_{7,3}^t \oplus k_{7,3}) \oplus s_4(Rj_{7,4}^t \oplus k_{7,4}) \oplus s_2(Rj_{7,5}^t \oplus k_{7,5}) \oplus s_3(Rj_{7,6}^t \oplus k_{7,6}) \oplus s_1(Rj_{7,8}^t \oplus k_{7,8}).$$

Check if  $\triangle_1$  equals  $\triangle_2$ . If so, output the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$ .

For the output values of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$ , comput  $\triangle_3$ , check if  $\triangle_3$  equals  $\triangle_1$ . If so, output the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$ . Similar process will go through  $\triangle_4$  up to  $\triangle_{22}$ .

Step3, For the output values of  $(t, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$  in Step2, choose some other plaintexts  $P23^t (\neq Pj^t, 1 \leq j \leq 22)$ , compute  $\triangle_{23}$ , check if  $\triangle_{23}$  equals  $\triangle_1$ . If so, output the value of  $(t, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(t, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$ . If there are more than one output value, then repeat Step3.

Invalid values of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$  that can pass Step2 will be successful with probability  $2^{-168}$ . Thus it is likely that there is only one output value for any fixed t after Step2, so there are about  $2^8$  different values after step2. Thus, the attack requires  $22 \times 2^8 + 2^8 + 2^8 = 3 \times 2^{11}$  chosen plaintexts. The main time complexity of the attack is in Step2, and the time of computing each  $\triangle$  is about the same as 3-round encryption, so the time complexity of an attack is less than that of  $(2 \times 2^8 \times 2^{168} + 2^8 \times 2^{160} + 2^8 \times 2^{153}) \times 1/3 < 2^{175} + 2^{174}$  encryptions.

Now we have known  $(k_{1,1}, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9)$ , we can decrypt the ninth and eighth round and recover the other bytes of  $k_7$  and get the user key of 9-round Camellia. The attack requires less than  $2^{13}$  chosen plaintexts and  $2^{175.6}$  encryptions.

#### 5.3 Attacking 10-round Camellia with 192/256 bit key

First guess  $k_{1,1}$ ,  $k_{6,7}$ ,  $k_{7,3}$ ,  $k_{7,4}$ ,  $k_{7,5}$ ,  $k_{7,6}$ ,  $k_{7,8}$ ,  $k_{8}$ ,  $k_{9}$ ,  $k_{10}$ . When  $k_{1,1}$  is given, we can get 8 bits of  $k_{8}$  from the key schedule. So we need guess 240 bits subkey. Using property (1) we construct the following algorithm:

#### Algorithm 6

Step1, For each possible value t of  $k_{1,1}$ , Choose 30 plaintexts  $Pj^t = (Lj_0^t, Rj_0^t)(1 \le j \le 30)$  as follows:

$$Lj_0^t = (i_j, \alpha_2, \cdots, \alpha_8),$$
  

$$Rj_0^t = (s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_4, s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1}), \beta_6, \beta_7, s_1(i_j \oplus k_{1,1})).$$

where  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_j$  are constants,  $0 \le i_j \le 255$ , and the the corresponding ciphertexts are  $Cj^t = (Lj_{10}^t, Rj_{10}^t)$ .

Step2, For each fixed value of t, for each possible value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9, k_{10})$ , First compute  $\triangle_1$  and  $\triangle_2$ , where

$$\Delta_j = s_4(Rj_{6,7}^t \oplus k_{6,7}) \oplus (Rj_{7,3}^t \oplus Rj_{7,4}^t \oplus Rj_{7,5}^t \oplus Rj_{7,6}^t \oplus Rj_{7,7}^t),$$

and

$$Lj_7^t = Rj_8^t, \quad Rj_7^t = Lj_8^t \oplus F(Rj_8^t, k_8),$$

$$Lj_8^t = Rj_9^t, \quad Rj_8^t = Lj_9^t \oplus F(Rj_9^t, k_9),$$

$$Lj_9^t = Rj_{10}^t, \quad Rj_9^t = Lj_{10}^t \oplus F(Rj_{10}^t, k_{10}),$$

$$Rj_{6,7}^t = Lj_{7,7}^t \oplus s_3(Rj_{7,3}^t \oplus k_{7,3}) \oplus s_4(Rj_{7,4}^t \oplus k_{7,4}) \oplus s_2(Rj_{7,5}^t \oplus k_{7,5}) \oplus s_3(Rj_{7,6}^t \oplus k_{7,6}) \oplus s_1(Rj_{7,8}^t \oplus k_{7,8}).$$

Check if  $\triangle_1$  equals  $\triangle_2$ . If so, output the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9, k_{10})$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9, k_{10})$ .

For the output values of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9, k_{10})$ , compute  $\triangle_3$ , check if  $\triangle_3$  equals  $\triangle_1$ . If so, output the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9, k_{10})$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9, k_{10})$ . Similar process will go through  $\triangle_4$  up to  $\triangle_{30}$ .

Step3, For the output values of  $(t, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9, k_{10})$  in Step2, choose some other plaintexts  $P31^t (\neq Pj^t, 1 \leq j \leq 30)$ , compute  $\triangle_{31}$ , check if  $\triangle_{31}$  equals  $\triangle_{1}$ . If so, output the value of  $(t, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9, k_{10})$ . Otherwise, discard the value of  $(t, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9, k_{10})$ . If there are more than one output value, then repeat Step3.

Invalid values of  $(k_{6,7},k_{7,3},k_{7,4},k_{7,5},k_{7,6},k_{7,8},k_8,k_9,k_{10})$  that can pass Step2 will be successful with probability  $2^{-232}$ . Thus it is likely that there is only one output value for any fixed t after Step2, so there are about  $2^8$  different values after step2. Thus, the attack requires  $30\times 2^8+2^8+2^8=2^{13}$  chosen plaintexts. The main time complexity of the attack is in Step2, and the time of computing each  $\triangle$  is about the same as 4-round encryption, so the time complexity of an attack is less than that of  $(2\times 2^8\times 2^{232}+2^8\times 2^{224}+2^8\times 2^{217})\times 4/10 < 2^{239}+2^{238}+2^{237}$  encryptions.

Now we have known  $(k_{1,1}, k_{6,7}, k_{7,3}, k_{7,4}, k_{7,5}, k_{7,6}, k_{7,8}, k_8, k_9, k_{10})$ , we can decrypt the tenth,ninth and eighth round and recover the other bytes of  $k_7$  and get the user key of 10-round Camellia. The attack requires less than  $2^{14}$  chosen plaintexts and  $2^{239.9}$  encryptions.

## 6 Concluding remarks

In this paper we have shown 4-round distinguishers of Camellia, and discussed the security of Camellia by using the 4-round distinguishers and collision-searching techniques. The following table compares the performance of some known attacks on Camellia.

Table 1. Comparison of attacks on reduced – round Camellia

Rounds	$FL/FL^{-1}$	Methods	Plaintexts	Time	Notes
6	No	Square attack	$2^{56}$	$2^{56}$	Ref[10]
6	No	Higher Order DC	$2^{17}$	$2^{18}$	Ref[4]
6	No	Collision attack	$2^{10}$	$2^{15}$	This paper(128-bit key)
7	No	Truncated DC	$2^{82.6}$	192	Ref[6]
7	No	Higher Order DC	$2^{19}$	$2^{57}$	Ref[5]
7	Yes	Square attack	$2^{56.2}$	$2^{57.2}$	Ref[11]
7	No	Collision attack	$2^{12}$	$2^{54.5}$	This paper(128-bit key)
8	No	Truncated DC	$2^{83.6}$	$2^{55.6}$	Ref[6]
8	No	Higher Order DC	$2^{20}$	$2^{120}$	Ref[5]
8	Yes	Square attack	$2^{59}$	$2^{116}$	Ref[11]
8	No	Collision attack	$2^{13}$	$2^{112.1}$	This paper(128-bit key)
8	No	Collision attack	$2^{13}$	$2^{111.1}$	This paper(192/256-bit key)
9	Yes/No	Higher Order DC	$2^{21}$	$2^{188}$	Ref[5]
9	Yes	Square attack	$2^{60}$	$2^{181.4}$	Ref[11]
9	No	Collision attack	$2^{113.6}$	$2^{121}$	This paper(128-bit key)
9	No	Collision attack	$2^{13}$	$2^{175.6}$	This paper(192/256-bit key)
10	No	Higher Order DC	$2^{21}$	$2^{252}$	Ref[5]
10	Yes	Square attack	$2^{60.6}$	$2^{246.3}$	Ref[11]
10	No	Collision attack	$2^{14}$	$2^{239.9}$	This paper(192/256-bit key)
11	Yes/No	Higher Order DC	$2^{93}$	$2^{255.6}$	Ref[5]

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